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Abstract: This paper deals with Borda count which is sincere voting system and originally proposed by 
French mathematician and philosopher Jeans-Charles Borda. In Borda count a defeated candidate can 
manipulate the election result in his favor in sincere way by introducing a candidate which is a clone of 
him and voters ranked this clone candidate immediately below him. In this situation Borda rule is strictly 
follows but manipulation is possible. The paper shows that this type of manipulation is vulnerable. Both 
single and simultaneous vulnerabilities of cloning manipulations are discussed with detail calculations and 
easier ways. 
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 Introduction 
    French mathematicians and philosophers Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794) and 
Jeans-Charles Borda (1733-1799) introduced modern voting system. The voting 
aggregation rules proposed by these two eighteenth-century scholars are very different in 
the political history. Borda developed a voting method named “method of marks” in 1770 
(Borda 1781). The Borda rule is a scoring method that yields a unique ranking, although 
not necessarily strict. Each elector ranks the alternatives according to his order of 
preference (ties disallowed). The Borda rule (Borda 1781) belongs to the class of point 
ranking rules where points are given to each candidate according to his rank in the 
preference of the voters. Once all votes have been counted and the candidate with the 
most points is the winner. It is currently used for the election of two ethnic minority 
members of the National Assembly of Slovenia, and in modified forms, to select 
presidential election candidates in Kiribati and to elect members of the Parliament of 
Nauru. It is also used throughout the world by various private organizations and 
competitions. In this method if there are n alternatives, an elector’s first choice is 
assigned ( )1−m  points, his second ( )2−m  points and so on down to his last choice, 
which is assigned 0 point. One property of the Borda rule is that each of the voters of 
each type gives ( )1−mm  marks to the candidates. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite 
(1975) explained that all reasonable voting procedures are sensitive to manipulate by 
strategic voters. Dummett (1998) suggested that in election agenda manipulation is 
possible. In this paper we will call it cloning manipulation. A cloning candidate y of a 
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candidate x is similar to him and all voters place y immediately below x in order rank. In 
this paper we follow the rules of Dummett (1998), Huang and Chua (2000) and Serais 
(2002). The Borda majority count is discussed in detail with many examples by Zahid 
and Swart (2010). A rule of voting is strategy-proof when every voter’s best strategy is 
his true preference-order, otherwise it is manipulable. 
    We have included two propositions with proof to clarify the concept of Borda voting 
and its cloning manipulations. 
 
Borda Voting 
   Let { }nN ,...,2,1 =  be the set of individual voters, and let { },...,, zyxY =  be the finite 
set of alternatives where  #(N ) = n and #(Y ) = m. If x is strictly preferred to y we write 
xPy and so on. If x is related to y we can write the binary relations as follows (Arrow 
1963, Islam et al. 2009): 
i) Reflexivity:    xRxYx ; ∈∀ . 
ii) Completeness:    yRxxRyyxYyx or  & , ⇒≠∈∀ . 
iii) Transitivity:    xRzyRzxRyYzyx ⇒∈∀  &  if , , , . 
iv) Anti-symmetry:  yxyRxxRyYyx =⇒∈∀  &  if , , . 
v) Asymmetry:     ( )yRxxRyYyx ~   such that  , , ⇒∈∀ . 
    An order or ranking is weak if it is reflexive and transitive and an order is linear if it is 
reflexive, transitive and asymmetric. Let a vector ( ),..., 21 rrr =  is a rank form where 1r  the 
rank of alternative is in 1 and so on. We can also represent a complete weak order in a 
sequence form, that is, by a sequence ...21ss , where 1s  and 2s  are the alternatives with 
ranks 1 and 2 respectively and so on. If each voter is asked to compare the alternatives 
pair by pair, as in the Condorcet procedure, her vote is summarized in a matrix   [ ] Ytsisti xX ∈= , . For any pair of alternatives ( ) 2, Yts ∈ , 1=istx   if voter i chooses s over t 
and 0=istx  otherwise, and 0=istx  if s = t. Now aggregate votes for n voters is a poll and 
is denoted by ∑
=
=
n
i
iXX
1
. Once voters have expressed their opinions in a poll, the 
problem is to aggregate these opinions in order to select a final ranking. The Borda rule 
and the maximum likelihood rule are the two methods considered here to accomplish this 
aggregation. 
    The points of Borda count are aggregated across voters to give the Borda score 
( ) ∑
=
=
m
t
sts xXb
1
 of s and the ranking ...21ss  such that   ( ) ( ) ( ) ≥≥≥ XbXbXb sss 321 … is the 
Borda ranking. It is unique but it admits ties. Again the Borda ranking is the weak order 
B (X) such that: 
                              Yts ∈∀ , ; ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )XbXbXBXB tsts ≥⇔≤ . 
where ( )XBs  is the rank of alternative s and B (·) is the Borda rule (Truchon 2006). 
Let iv  be the number of voters, then for the alternative ‘a’ the Borda count (B) can be 
defined by; 
                    ( ) ( )1...10 21 −×++×+×= kvvvaB k                                      
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                             = ( )∑
=
−×
k
i
i iv
1
1 .    
Borda rule is reflexive and transitive and also obey neutrality that is all candidates are 
treated equally. It is also unanimous that is if every voter gives to a candidate C a higher 
rank than to all other candidates, then C wins in the election and Borda count avoid 
dictatorship.  
 
Arithmetical Calculations 
      Let us assume that there are 17 voters of three types and three alternatives x, y, z and 
the preference profile be as follows (Islam et al. 2011): 
Type 1: xPyPz  by 8 voters, 
Type 2: yPzPx  by 5 voters, 
Type 3: zPxPy  by 4 voters. 
Borda count in this profile be as follows: 
For x: 8×2+5×0+4×1 = 20 marks, 
For y: 8×1+5×2+4×0 = 18 marks, 
For z: 8×0+5×1+4×2 = 13 marks. 
Here x gets highest marks 20, so x wins. We observed that Borda method is for sincere 
voters and has no voter paradox but it has some problems. Black (1948, 1958) and 
Satterthwaite (1975) modified the Borda method by misrepresentation of their 
preferences by the electors. Now we modify the above example by adding two 
alternatives u and v. The preference profile would be as follows: 
Type 1: xPyPzPuPv  by 8 voters, 
Type 2: yPzPxPuPv  by 5 voters, 
Type 3: zPxPyPuPv  by 4 voters. 
Now Borda counts would be as follows: 
For x: 8×4+5×2+4×3 = 54 marks, 
For y: 8×3+5×4+4×2 = 52 marks, 
For z: 8×2+5×3+4×4 = 47 marks, 
For u: 8×1+5×1+4×1 = 17 marks, 
For v: 8×0+5×0+4×0 =   0  mark. 
So that in this case x wins again. Type-3 voters have realized that x would win in the 
election then they would have change their preference profile as;  
                                          Type 3: zPyPuPvPx by 4 voters, 
 so that the Borda counts would be,  
For x: 8×4+5×2+4×0 = 42 marks, 
For y: 8×3+5×4+4×3 = 56 marks, 
For z: 8×2+5×3+4×4 = 47 marks, 
For u: 8×1+5×1+4×2 = 21 marks, 
For v: 8×0+5×0+4×1 =   4 marks. 
 In this case y would have won. The voters of type-3 would have been better off than 
when they voted honestly; the method provides a temptation for misrepresentation of 
preferences. The possibility of manipulation of the result of an election through the 
misrepresentation of preferences as described above was considered neither by Borda nor 
by Condorcet. 
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Cloning Manipulation in Borda Voting 
    We have seen that Borda did not use manipulation in his voting method. But we can 
manipulate the Borda rule by introducing a cloning candidate (Serais 2002). Suppose x 
would be defeated in an election following Borda count (Islam et al. 2011). The candidate 
x can manipulate the election outcome in his favor by introducing his clone y (say) in the 
choice set, the clone y being defined as an alternative which is ranked immediately below 
x in the individual preferences. 
   Choose a set YA ⊆  be a finite set where ( ) mA ≤# . Now for { }zyxA ,, =  the six 
possible preference orderings over A will be numbered as in following table-1: 
 
Table 1: Possible preference orderings over the set A. 
1n  2n  3n  4n  5n  6n  
x 
y 
z 
x 
z 
y 
y 
x 
z 
y 
z 
x 
z 
x 
y 
z 
y 
x 
A voting situation is a vector, ( )61 ,..., nns = , where ( )6,...,1  =jn j  be the number of type 
j voters and ∑
=
=
6
1j
j nn . Here n is the total number of voters in an election. Let 
{ }nn ssS ,..., 1=  be the set of all possible voting situations. A social choice function   
ASf n →: , assigns to each voting situation a non-empty subset of A. Let xyN  be the 
number of voters who prefer x to y, x sBS ,  be the Borda score of x, and 
xy
sBS ,  be the 
difference of Borda score between x and y for the voting situations i.e., y sB
x
sB
xy
sB SSS ,,, −= .  
   Now we can introduce the mathematical definition of a clone as follows: A candidate y 
is a clone of x for a voting situations if and only if { }yxXz ,\∈∀ , Ni ∈∀                       
zyPzxP ii     ⇔  and Ni ∈∀ ,  yxPi .  
    This type of manipulation was introduced by Dummett (1998) where he called it 
agenda manipulation. Dummett observed that the Borda rule may suffer from this 
manipulation and explained by a series of examples.  
 
Arithmetical Calculations 
    First we set an example where there are 12 voters and they have to choose preference 
relation among four alternatives x, y, z and u. Let the preference profile be as follows: 
Type 1: yPuPzPx    by   2 voters, 
Type 2: uPzPxPy    by   2 voters, 
Type 3: zPuPyPx    by  2 voters, 
Type 4: xPuPyPz    by  3 voters, 
                                              Type 5: xPyPuPz    by   1 voter, 
Type 6: zPyPxPu    by  2 voters. 
Borda votes for this profile be as follows: 
For x: 2×0+2×1+2×0+3×3+1×3+2×1 = 16 marks, 
 For y: 2×3+2×0+2×1+3×1+1×2+2×2 = 17 marks, 
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 For z: 2×1+2×2+2×3+3×0+1×0+2×3 = 18 marks, 
 For u: 2×2+2×3+2×2+3×2+1×1+2×0 = 21 marks. 
Here u gets highest 21 marks, so u wins and y gets second of the lowest 17 marks. 
Dummett assumes that before the election, a fifth candidate, v is introduced by y whom 
every voter ranks immediately below y. Then the preference profile would be as follows: 
   Type 1: yPvPuPzPx     by  2 voters, 
   Type 2: uPzPxPyPv     by  2 voters, 
   Type 3: zPuPyPvPx     by  2 voters, 
   Type 4: xPuPyPvPz     by  3 voters, 
                                             Type 5: xPyPvPuPz     by   1 voter, 
   Type 6: zPyPvPxPu     by  2 voters. 
Then the Borda votes would be as follows: 
For x: 2×0+2×2+2×0+3×4+1×4+2×1 = 22 marks, 
For y: 2×4+2×1+2×2+3×2+1×3+2×3 = 29 marks, 
For z: 2×1+2×3+2×4+3×0+1×0+2×4 = 24 marks, 
For u: 2×2+2×4+2×3+3×3+1×1+2×0 = 28 marks, 
For v: 2×3+2×0+2×1+3×1+1×2+2×2 = 17 marks. 
Now y gets highest score of 29 marks and wins in the election. Here we observed that in 
initial voting situation y scored second of the lowest 17 marks but after cloning a 
candidate v as fifth candidate by y placed him in first position. So that cloning 
manipulation is sufficiently powerful to win in an election by a losing candidate. 
 
Single Cloning Manipulation 
    Let there are two losing candidates in an election. Now we will discuss the cloning 
manipulation by a single loser. Let { }zyxA ,, =  then the voting situation 1s  be as 
follows: 
Table 2: The Voting Situation of 1s . 
1n  2n  3n  4n  5n  6n  Scores 
x 
y 
z 
x 
z 
y 
z 
x 
y  
z 
y 
x 
y 
z 
x 
y 
x 
z 
2 
1 
0 
 
From table-2 we find; 
 ( ) 6321, 21 nnnnS x sB +++= ,    ( )6541, 21 nnnnS y sB +++=   and 
( ) 5432, 21 nnnnS z sB +++=         
321 nnnN xy ++= ,  654 nnnN yx ++=  ,  621 nnnN xz ++= ,  543 nnnN zx ++=    
651 nnnN yz ++=  and 432 nnnN zy ++=  
            nnnnnnnNN zyyz =+++++=+ 654321  
Similarly,    nNN yxyx =+  and  nNN zxxz =+ . 
    Let 01
,
≥xy
sBS  and 01, ≥
xz
sBS , so that x wins by Borda counts. Now suppose y is in the 
lowest position by Borda counts. The candidate y could introduce u whom every voter 
ranks immediately below y. Then the voting situation 2s  would be as follows: 
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 Table 3: The Voting Situation of 2s . 
1n  2n  3n  4n  5n  6n  Scores 
x 
y 
u 
z 
x 
z 
y 
u 
z 
x 
y 
u 
z 
y 
u 
x 
y 
u 
z 
x 
y 
u 
x 
z 
3 
2 
1 
0 
 
From table-3 we find: 
                 ( ) 6321, 232 nnnnS x sB +++=  
                          ( )( ) ( )32163212 nnnnnnn ++++++=  
                          =
xy
x
sB NS +1, , 
                 ( )654321, 3222 nnnnnnS y sB +++++=  
                         ( )( ) ( )6543216541 2 nnnnnnnnnn +++++++++=    
                         = nS y
sB +1, , 
                 ( ) 5432, 322 nnnnS z sB +++=  
                         ( )( ) ( )4325432 2 nnnnnnn ++++++=  
                         = zy
z
sB NS +1, , 
                ( )6541, 22 nnnnS u sB +++= = y sBS 1, . 
Since u is cloned by y, so u is always beaten by y. Now y beats x if,  
                        
xy
sByx SN 1,>  i.e., xy
x
sB
y
sB NSnS +>+ 11 ,,  
                 i.e.,  ( ) ( ) ( ) 6341326541 2332 nnnnnnnnnn +++>+++++  .            (1) 
       Now y beats  z if,  
              
zy
sByz SN 1,≥ i.e., zy
z
sBzyyz
y
sB NSNNS +≥++ 11 ,,  i.e., zy
z
sB
y
sB NSnS +≥+ 11 ,,  
              i.e., ( ) ( ) ( ) 5243326541 2332 nnnnnnnnnn +++>+++++  .              (2) 
Here we have 6 preference types and 4 candidates but u is the clone of y. The new 
candidate u is always ranked after y in the individual preferences. Inequalities (1) and (2) 
satisfy all the properties of Borda rule, so that y wins in the election. 
    In this section we have shown by calculations that Borda voting is for sincere voters 
and manipulation is impossible but a defeated candidate can manipulate Borda voting in 
his favor by introducing his clone (Islam et al. 2011).  
 
Simultaneous Cloning Manipulation 
    Now we describe the cloning manipulation by both of the losing candidates. In table-2 
we have considered that x wins but y and z have defeated. Now both y and z could 
introduce cloning candidates. Let u be the clone of y and v be the clone of z and let only y 
would be benefited by cloning. The voting situation 3s would be as follows: 
  From table-4 we find: 
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             ( ) ( )6321, 243 nnnnS x sB +++=  
                     ( )( ) ( ) ( )62132163212 nnnnnnnnnn +++++++++=  
                      = xzxy
x
sB NNS ++1, , 
Table 4: The voting situation of 3s . 
1n  2n  3n  4n  5n  6n  Scores 
x 
y 
u 
z 
v 
x 
z 
v 
y 
u 
z 
v 
x 
y 
u 
z 
v 
y
 
u 
x 
y 
u 
z 
v 
x 
y 
u 
x 
z 
v 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
            ( )654321, 4233 nnnnnnS y sB +++++=  
                    ( )( ) ( ) ( )6516543216541 2 nnnnnnnnnnnnn ++++++++++++=  
                    = yz
y
sB NnS ++1, , 
           ( ) 654321, 2433 nnnnnnS z sB +++++=  
                   ( )( ) ( ) ( )4326543215432 2 nnnnnnnnnnnnn ++++++++++++=  
                   = zy
z
sB NnS ++1, , 
          ( )6541, 323 nnnnS u sB +++=  
                  ( )( ) ( )6516541 2 nnnnnnn ++++++=  
                  = yz
y
sB NS +1, , 
         ( ) 5432, 323 nnnnS v sB +++=  
                 ( )( ) ( )4325432 2 nnnnnnn ++++++=  
                 = zy
z
sB NS +1, . 
Since u is the clone of y, so that u is beaten by y always. Hence y beats x if,  03
,
>yx
sBS  
       xz
xy
sB
y
sB NSS +>⇒ 11 ,,     i.e., xz
x
sB
y
sB NSS +> 11 ,,2  i.e., xz
x
sByzyx
y
sB NSNNS +>++ 11 ,,  
          i.e., 
xyxz
x
sBxyyzyx
y
sB NNSNNNS ++>+++ 11 ,,  
           i.e., xyxz
x
sByz
y
sB NNSNnS ++>++ 11 ,, ,    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )32162163216516541 22 nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn +++++++++>+++++++
                    i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )6321432165 24234 nnnnnnnnnn +++>+++++ .           (3) 
  Again v is the clone of  z  so that  03
,
≥yz
sBS  gives 03, ≥
zv
sBS  which implies 03, ≥
yv
sBS . 
Again  y beats z  if  03
,
≥yz
sBS    yzzy
yz
sB NNS −≥⇒ 3,   zy
z
sByz
y
sB NnSNnS ++≥++⇒ 11 ,,  
     i.e., ( ) ( ) 615243432165 234234 nnnnnnnnnnnn +++++>+++++ .             (4) 
Here we have 6 preference types and 5 candidates but we find that there are two new 
candidates u and v are always ranked respectively after y and z in the individual 
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preferences. Hence u is the clone of y and v is the clone z. Inequalities (3) and (4) satisfy 
all the properties of Borda voting, so that y wins in the election. 
    In this section we have shown by calculations that Borda voting is for sincere voters 
and manipulation is impossible but two defeated candidates can manipulate Borda voting 
in their favor by introducing their clones (Islam et al. 2011).  
 
Proposition 1: Borda voting is manipulation free but it is not free from cloning 
manipulation. 
Proof: From the above discussion we have observed that Borda voting is for sincere 
voters. In this method voting manipulation is impossible said by Jeans-Charles Borda.  
Also we have shown by arithmetic calculations that cloning manipulation of Borda voting 
is possible in sincere ways. Again we have discussed by algebraic calculations of the  
single cloning manipulation of Borda voting in detail. The simultaneous cloning 
manipulation of Borda voting is also elucidated clearly by algebraic calculations. Hence 
Borda voting is manipulation free but it is not free from cloning manipulation. Q.E.D. 
 
Vulnerabilities in Borda Cloning Manipulation 
    Although Borda voting is cloning manipulable in sincere ways but it is vulnerable. 
Huang and Chua (2000) have discussed the vulnerability in Borda cloning manipulation. 
Let Z(n) be the set of the cloning manipulation of the Borda voting situations which can 
be write as a polynomial of n as follows: 
                                    ( ) 0122334455 xnxnxnxnxnxnZ +++++=                         (5) 
where bian += , i = 0,1,...,5 and b is the productivity of the integer sequence for which 
the representation is valid, and a is such that ( )ban mod = . From (5) the six equations 
can be written as; 
                         101
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5 Kxnxnxnxnxnx =+++++ ,                                    (6a) 
                         201
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5 Kxnxnxnxnxnx =+++++ ,                                    (6b) 
                         301
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5 Kxnxnxnxnxnx =+++++ ,                                    (6c) 
                         401
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5 Kxnxnxnxnxnx =+++++ ,                                    (6d) 
                         501
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5 Kxnxnxnxnxnx =+++++ ,                                    (6e) 
                         601
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5 Kxnxnxnxnxnx =+++++ ,                                    (6f) 
where { }621 ,...,, KKKZ =  are the set of the cloning manipulation of the Borda voting 
situations. The Huang and Chua algorithm (Huang and Chua 2000) obtain the 
periodicities are b = 24 and b = 15 for single and simultaneous cloning manipulation 
respectively. They have set 6 equations with 6 unknowns ( )510 ,...,, xxx  as like (6) and 
have solved these 6 simultaneous equations to obtain the value of these 6 unknowns. 
Huang and Chua (2000) solved the values of 6 unknowns for vulnerability in single 
cloning manipulation as follows:   
4408800 −=x , =1x  94221, =2x 208580, =3x 111750, =4x 24420, and =5x 1909. 
Huang and Chua (2000) also solved the values of 6 unknowns for vulnerability in 
simultaneous cloning manipulation as follows:   
2142080 −=x , =1x  32280, =2x 109260, =3x 58745, =4x 12900, and =5x 1023. 
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Hence the polynomials of vulnerability of in single cloning manipulation are as; 
       ( ) 44088094221208580111750244201909 2345 −++++= nnnnnnZ             (7) 
 and the polynomials of vulnerability of in single cloning manipulation are as; 
       ( ) 2142083228010926058745129001023 2345 −++++= nnnnnnZ .               (8) 
Let ( )( )baBV cl ,  and ( )( )baBV simcl ,  be the vulnerability of Borda rule to single and 
simultaneous cloning manipulation respectively. We divide the cardinality Z(n) by the 
total number of situations. From (7) and (8) we obtain the following vulnerabilities of 
Borda rule to single and simultaneous cloning manipulation respectively for a = 1 (Huang 
and Chua 2000, Serais 2002) as follows: 
       ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )5 4 3 2 1 3072
44088094221208580111750244201909241,
2345
+++++
−++++
=
nnnnn
nnnnnBV cl ,   (9) 
 
      ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )5 4 3 2 1 1875
2142083228010926058745129001023151,
2345
+++++
−++++
=
nnnnn
nnnnnBV simcl .    (10) 
Now we calculate the vulnerabilities of single and simultaneous cloning manipulations 
for different values of n. 
    For n = 1 from (9) we get, 
( )( ) 0
654323072
44088094221208580111750244201909241, =
×××××
−++++
=
clBV , 
For n = 1 from (10) we get, 
( )( ) 0
654321875
2142083228010926058745129001023151, =
×××××
−++++
=
simclBV . 
For n = 2 from (9) we get, 
( )( )
765433072
440880294221420858081117501624420321909241,
×××××
−×+×+×+×+×
=
clBV  
                    = 0.4286. 
For n = 2 from (10) we get, 
( )( )
765431875
21420823228041092608587451612900321023151,
×××××
−×+×+×+×+×
=
simclBV  
                      = 0.2857. 
For n = 3 from (9) we get, 
( )( )
876543072
44088039422192085802711175081244202431909241,
×××××
−×+×+×+×+×
=
clBV  
                    = 0.3571. 
For n = 3 from (10) we get, 
( )( )
876541875
2142083322809109260275874581129002431023151,
×××××
−×+×+×+×+×
=
simclBV  
                       =0.2973. 
For n = 4 from (9) we get, 
( )( )
987653072
44088049422116208580641117502562442010241909241,
×××××
−×+×+×+×+×
=
clBV
                    = 0.4011. 
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For n = 4 from (10) we get, 
( )( )
987651875
2142084322801610926064587452561290010241023151,
×××××
−×+×+×+×+×
=
simclBV
                       =0.3447. 
Similarly we proceed for n = 5, 6, … and finally we calculate for ∞=n  as follows: 
                                          ( )( ) 6214.0
3072
1909241, ==clBV , 
                                           ( )( ) 5456.0
1875
1023151, ==clBV . 
The aggregated calculating values of the vulnerabilities of the Borda rule are given in 
table-5 below. 
                    Table 5: Vulnerabilities of the Borda rule in cloning manipulations. 
n Single manipulation Simultaneous manipulation 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
... 
... 
... 
 
∞  
0 
 
0.4286 
 
0.3571 
 
0.4011 
... 
... 
... 
 
0.6214 
0 
 
0.2857 
 
0.2973 
 
0.3447 
... 
... 
... 
 
0.5456 
 
Proposition 2: Borda voting suffers from vulnerabilities of cloning manipulations.  
Proof: In proposition-1 we have seen that the cloning manipulations of Borda voting in 
single and simultaneous ways are possible. Again we have discussed that Borda cloning 
manipulation is not strong and it is vulnerable. The vulnerabilities in cloning 
manipulations of Borda voting have shown with arithmetic and algebraic calculations and 
aggregated the vulnerabilities in table-5. For n = 1 there is no vulnerability but 
vulnerabilities varies for both single and simultaneous cloning manipulations from n = 
2,3,...,∞. Hence Borda voting suffers from vulnerabilities of cloning manipulations. 
Q.E.D . 
 
Concluding Remarks 
    In this paper we have discussed Borda voting and cloning manipulation of Borda 
count. Dummett (1998), Huang and Chua (2000) have analyzed the cloning manipulation 
of Borda count. In this paper the Borda voting and its cloning manipulation is given in 
simple way and with some detail calculations. Finally we have shown both single and 
simultaneous vulnerabilities of the Borda rule in cloning manipulation. The calculations, 
tables and propositions with proof are given in more clear ways. 
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